The ASTIS database cites the following 15 publication(s) by Adam Lajeunesse. Publications are listed from newest to oldest. Please tell us about publications that are not yet cited in ASTIS.
From Polar Sea to straight baselines : Canadian Arctic policy in the Mulroney era / Lajeunesse, A. Huebert, R.
[Calgary, Alta : Centre for Military and Strategic Studies], 2017.
xxv, 127 p. : ill., map ; 28 cm.
(Documents on Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security, v. 11, 2017)
ASTIS record 83550.
In 1985, the government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announced the drawing of straight baselines around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, defining the full extent of the country's Arctic maritime sovereignty and enshrining that sovereignty in legislation for the first time. This decision was a reaction to the voyage of the US Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage that summer, an expedition that both sparked a political crisis and led to years of negotiations between Canada and the United States to settle the precise status of the northern waters. This volume contains documents surrounding that policy shift and the subsequent negotiations, which students, academics, and policy makers can use to chart the development of Canadian policy and Canadian-American relations in the Arctic. From this, readers can gain a greater understanding - not only of Canadian history - but of the nature of Canadian Arctic policy, and why it exists in its present form. (Au)
R, L, T
Foreign relations; Geopolitics; Government; Government regulations; Inuit; Marine navigation; Marine transportation; Maritime law; Negotiation; Polar Sea (Ship); Sovereignty; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Canadian Arctic; Canadian Arctic waters
Chinese mining interests and the Arctic / Lajeunesse, A. Lackenbauer, P.W.
In: Governing the North American Arctic : sovereignty, security, and institutions / Edited by D.A. Berry, N. Bowles and H. Jones. - New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, Ch. 3, p. 74-99
St Antony's Series.
ASTIS record 82524.
Since the mid-1980s, double-digit gross domestic product (GDP) growth has driven the Chinese economy from an agrarian peasant base to the manufacturing center of the world, its economy now second in size only to the United States. This industrial expansion has, naturally, been accompanied by an explosion in resource consumption. China accounts for about one-fifth of the world's population, yet consumes half of its cement, one-third of its steel, over a quarter of its aluminum, two-thirds of its iron ore, and more than 45 percent of its coal. In only the past 13 years, China has also swallowed up over four-fifths of the increase in the world's copper supply. For most of the country's fantastic growth, its own vast resources proved sufficient to support its industrial expansion. In the past decade, however, China has recognized the need to augment these supplies with foreign sources, and Chinese companies, normally state-owned enterprises (SOEs), have tapped into the vast reserves of the state and state-owned banks (SOBs) to secure access to mineral deposits abroad. ... In a 2013 survey of mining companies, undertaken by the Fraser Institute, over 90 percent responded that it had become more difficult to raise capital for new projects. Partially as a result, only 46 percent of companies surveyed planned to increase their exploration budgets in 2013 - down from 68 percent in 2012 and 82 percent in 2011. North America's junior exploration firms have been hit the hardest, since they have long relied on the multinationals to acquire them or on private investors to fund them. With capital being held back, many now face bankruptcy. In a response to the Fraser Institute survey, the manager of one exploration company observed that while there is money in the West to develop these projects, it simply isn't flowing to the companies that need it. 'Eastern countries', meanwhile, 'have a more optimistic outlook and hence dominate investment into the mining industry'. Chinese money is therefore not only coming to the West but it is moving in when many of the private sector mining firms are limiting their own expansion. ... (Au)
P, R, T, J
Economic conditions; Economic development; Employment; Environmental impacts; Foreign relations; Geopolitics; Government; Inuit; Izok Project; Labour costs; Labour mobility; Mineral industries; Minerals; Mining; Negotiation
G02, G0813, G10
Canadian Arctic; Greenland; Izok Lake region, Nunavut
Lock, stock, and icebergs : a history of Canada's Arctic maritime sovereignty / Lajeunesse, A.
Vancouver, B.C. : UBC Press, 2016.
xv, 404 p. : ill., maps ; 24 cm.
ISBN 9780774831086 , 9780774831093
ASTIS record 82513.
In 1988, after years of failed negotiations over the status of the Northwest Passage, Brian Mulroney gave Ronald Reagan a globe, pointed to the Arctic, and said "Ron that's ours. We own it lock, stock, and icebergs." A simple statement, it summed up a hundred years of official policy. Since the nineteenth century, Canadian governments have claimed ownership of the land and the icy passageways that make up the Arctic Archipelago. Unfortunately for Ottawa, many countries - including the United States - still do not recognize the Northwest Passage as internal Canadian waters. Crucial to understanding the complex nature of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is an understanding of its history. In Lock, Stock, and Icebergs, Adam Lajeunesse draws on a wealth of recently declassified Canadian and American archival material to chart the origins and development of Canadian Arctic maritime policy - from the earliest police patrols in Hudson Bay to the deployment of nuclear submarines. Detailing decades of internal policy debates, secret negotiations with the United States, and long-classified joint-defence projects, he traces the circuitous history of Canada's official claim to the Northwest Passage and other Arctic waters. Lock, Stock, and Icebergs shows how successive governments spent decades trying to figure out what exactly ownership of these waters entailed. It sets the stage for understanding the challenges Canada now faces as it navigates a rapidly changing Arctic, especially in terms of balancing the political requirements of sovereignty with concerns about the environmental and economic and social development. One thing is certain: in the years to come, strengthening Arctic sovereignty will become a more complex process than ever before. (Au)
R, P, J, V
Archives; Economic development; Foreign relations; Government; Government regulations; History; Manhattan (Ship); Marine navigation; Military history; Military operations; Negotiation; Oil fields; Social conditions; Sovereignty; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; Water pollution
Canadian Arctic; Canadian Arctic waters; Northwest Passage
The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic : purpose, capabilities, and requirements / Lajeunesse, A.
[Calgary, Alta : Centre for Military and Strategic Studies], 2015.
12 p. : ill., map ; 28 cm.
ASTIS record 82633.
Executive summary: Over the past fifteen years, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has been rebuilding its capacity to operate in the Arctic. It has been a difficult task and progress has been slow. Yet, the need for these capabilities is unquestioned. A changing Arctic environment coupled with expanding shipping routes and resource development promises to bring new activity (and potential threats) to the region. As such, the CAF’s role in the Arctic will only grow in importance. The military’s responsibilities in the region, as outlined in Canadian policy documents, are broad. They centre on defending Canadian sovereignty and security – concepts that cover the spectrum of defence activity, from peacetime military engagement to major combat operations. In practice, however, the CAF has had to narrow its focus, in order to apply limited resources to where they can most effectively meet the government’s ‘sovereignty’ and ‘security’ mandates. This has meant downplaying its focus on conventional security threats and a large permanent presence on the assumption that such efforts would be wasted in the absence of any real state-based threat. Instead, the CAF has invested in building up its adaptive dispersed operations capability, designed for a wide spectrum of security situations that it will manage in partnership with other government departments. In so doing, it will reinforce Canadian sovereignty by contributing to the government-wide exercise of effective control to ensure that Canadian law and regulation is adhered to in the Arctic. For the Army this has meant establishing a number of small, but well trained, reserve and permanent force units designed for rapid and agile response. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is about to begin construction of its Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS), which will offer a valuable constabulary, research, and general use platform to the RCN as well as other government departments and agencies with Arctic mandates. The situational awareness required to support these efforts is, likewise, being buttressed by new satellites and monitoring technologies that should come online as increased activity warrants their deployment. At present, significant hurdles remain in the CAF’s ability to deploy, move, and work effectively in the Arctic, however it has made real progress from a near standing start. Its operational focus is well designed and its capabilities are increasing at a sufficient pace to keep up with actual requirements. (Au)
Airplanes; Foreign relations; Government; Government regulations; International law; Marine navigation; Military operations; Military policy; Royal Canadian Navy; Satellites; Sovereignty; Strategic studies
G0811, G0812, G0813, G0815
Canadian Arctic Islands waters; Inuvialuit Settlement Region, N.W.T./Yukon; N.W.T.; Nunavut; Yukon
Ice islands in Canadian policy, 1954-1971 / Lajeunesse, A.
[Calgary, Alta : Centre for Military and Strategic Studies], 2015.
x, 152 p. ; 28 cm.
(Documents on Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security, v. 5, 2015)
ASTIS record 82193.
Ice islands are large rafts of multi-year ice that are carried by currents around the Arctic Ocean. They became politically significant in the early 1950s when American and Soviet research parties began occupying them. This activity called into question their legal status and highlighted the uncertain nature of polar maritime jurisdiction. This volume tracks the evolution of Canadian policy vis-à-vis ice islands and examines how the politics surrounding these bodies influenced the country’s broader position on Arctic maritime sovereignty. (Au)
R, G, V
Foreign relations; Government; Government regulations; Ice islands; International law; Military history; Military operations; Military policy; Sovereignty; Strategic studies; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Canadian Arctic; Canadian Arctic waters
Canadian Arctic defence policy : a synthesis of key documents, 1970-2013 / Dean, R. Lackenbauer, P.W. Lajeunesse, A.
[Calgary, Alta : Centre for Military and Strategic Studies], 2014.
v, 80 p. ; 28 cm.
(Documents on Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security, v. 1, 2014)
ASTIS record 82112.
This volume is a synthesis and analysis of Canadian government documents on the subject of Arctic defence from 1970 to 2013. It focuses on policy papers, committee reports, public addresses, and other publicly available material. It is designed for researchers focusing on the evolution of Canadian defence policy and priorities in the Arctic. (Au)
Canadian Coast Guard; Foreign relations; Government; Government relations; International law; Military history; Military operations; Military policy; Sovereignty; Strategic studies
Canadian Arctic; Canadian Arctic waters
Developing the offshore in the North American Arctic / Lackenbauer, P.W. Lajeunesse, A.
(The journal of ocean technology (St. John's, N.L.), v. 9, no. 2, April 1, 2014, p. 114-115, ill.)
ASTIS record 81353.
The article focuses on the U.S. Geological Survey depicting the assessment of circumpolar oil and gas resources. It mentions that Arctic has 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids to be found offshore. It mentions that international oil companies are focused on spending money on leases and seismic drilling in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. (Au)
Q, D, R
International law; Offshore oil fields; Offshore oil well drilling; Offshore seismic surveys; Petroleum leases
Beaufort Sea; Chukchi Sea
The new economics of North American Arctic oil / Lajeunesse, A.
(The American review of Canadian studies, v. 43, no. 1, 2013, p. 107-122)
ASTIS record 79537.
Over the past five years there has been a remarkable resurgence in oil and gas exploration in the North American Arctic. From complete disinterest only a half a decade ago the region has attracted billions of dollars in new investments from a host of different international oil companies. Unlike the past booms in the region, which inevitably ended in busts, this new wave of development is different. This article examines the changes in both the Arctic itself as well as the global energy environment and concludes that the North American Arctic will see slow but sustained development over the coming decades, ultimately becoming one of the last great oil producing regions in the world. (Au)
Q, R, T, D, L, J
Boundaries; Continental shelves; Costs; Economic conditions; Economic development; Economic feasibility; Environmental law; Environmental protection; Geopolitics; Government regulations; History; Hydrocarbons; Mapping; Marine petroleum transportation; Maritime law; Native land claims; Native peoples; NEB Review of Policy on Same Season Relief Well Capability for Drilling in the Beaufort Sea; Nordicity; Offshore oil well blowouts; Offshore oil well drilling; Petroleum industry; Petroleum law; Pollution control; Prices; Public opinion; Safety; Self-determination; Sovereignty
G07, G04, G02, G0815
Arctic waters; Beaufort Sea; Chukchi Sea; Northwest Passage; Prudhoe Bay, Alaska
A very practical requirement : under-ice operations in the Canadian Arctic, 1960-1986 / Lajeunesse, A.
(Cold war history, v. 13, no. 4, 2013, p. 507-524)
References as footnotes.
Indexed a PDF file from the Web.
ASTIS record 79217.
In May 1986 three American nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) surfaced at the North Pole. Their mission was routine - weapons tests, environmental studies, and data collection - similar to dozens of operations that had come before. Politically however this operation attracted some unusual attention. Barely a year after the USCG Polar Sea had created a public uproar by transiting the Northwest Passage without Canadian permission these boats resurrected the smouldering political issue of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Specific information on their routes was not provided but the fact that two of them had been deployed from the Atlantic led many to assume that they may have travelled through the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The question of American activity in Canada's Arctic waters had long been a sensitive subject. Yet, while the routes and activities of these boats have normally been classified, it had long been suspected that they were operating in secret throughout the Canadian north. These concerns date back to the 1960s when such operations were known to have begun and continued into the 1980s, when the increased strategic importance of the region brought the issue to the fore. Despite the close military relationship between the two countries, the continued American refusal to recognise Canada's maritime sovereignty in the region meant that any US activity in the north was viewed with suspicion and concern by the Canadian public. This feeling was amply demonstrated in 1986 as opposition members in the House of Commons, the Canadian media and the general public expressed their apprehension that the United States was secretly and regularly deploying its forces into the Arctic. It was assumed that there was little the Canadian government could do to control or monitor this activity and that Canadian sovereignty must be suffering accordingly. Eventually, this mounting public and political pressure forced the government of Brian Mulroney into something of a confession which implied that Canada did in fact have some knowledge of these transits. Still, the ambiguity of this statement and the government's general stonewalling on the matter meant that few of these concerns were alleviated. Experts on the subject have traditionally fallen in line with these suspicions and have questioned how much knowledge Mulroney and past Canadian governments really had about American operations. In 1987 John Honderich wrote that 'to expect the United States to routinely inform Canada every time one of its submarines traverses Canadian water is to fail to understand how the US military works'. That same year, Franklyn Griffiths hypothesised that one day the US might be able to bring the log books of its secret submarine transits to the International Court of Justice as evidence that the passages of the Arctic Archipelago had long been used as an international waterway. In 1990 David Larson guessed that Canada might have been able to establish some form of secret agreement with the Americans, yet just as likely was the possibility that the transits were being made without permission. In 1998 Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel conjectured that Canada had no way of monitoring or stopping the transits of these boats. And, in one of the most recent major works on the subject, Shelagh Grant wrote in 2010 that the presence of these undetected submarines posed a danger to Canadian sovereignty, even if only a theoretical one. The purpose of this article is to challenge these assumptions and to present a far different interpretation of the Canadian-American defence relationship in the Cold War Arctic. In fact, from the 1960s to at least 1986 (the point at which all publicly available documentation ends) the American submarine program in Canada's northern waters appears to have been undertaken not as a secret assault on Canadian sovereignty but as a fully cooperative venture. During this period the US Navy did not use these waters as a regular patrol area and, when it did, transits were normally conducted as some form of joint operation. The documents now available list only eight such voyages between 1960 and 1986 and it seems likely that Canada knew about each of these and concurred with their taking place. ... (Au)
V, R, L, M
Atomic power; Communication; Cruise missiles; Design and construction; Detection; Foreign relations; Government; Instruments; International law; Military operations; Navigational aids; Public opinion; Research; Sovereignty; Strategic studies; Submarines; Testing; Underwater acoustics
G08, G14, G0815, G03
Arctic Ocean; Canada; Canadian Arctic Islands waters; North Pole; Northwest Passage; Russian Federation; United States
Staking a claim : the evolution of Canada's Arctic maritime sovereignty, 1880-1990 / Lajeunesse, A. Bercuson, D. [Supervisor]
Calgary, Alta. : University of Calgary, 2012.
vi, 399 p. : map ; 28 cm.
Indexed a PDF file from the Web.
ASTIS record 81628.
Libraries: ACU OONL
In April 1988, Canada and the United States of America were locked in a series of high level negotiations surrounding the question of Arctic maritime sovereignty. During one of the meetings between Brian Mulroney and Ronald Reagan in which the question was discussed, the Prime Minister produced a globe, pointed to the Arctic and said simply, "Ron that's ours. We own it lock, stock, and icebergs." The legal and political status of the Arctic waters has always been a complex and uncertain question; yet, at the same time, it has always enjoyed a remarkable simplicity for most Canadians and their government. While no Canadian government of the past century would question the country's absolute right to sovereignty in the High North, few have looked beyond that political certainty to examine the basis of that right. What exactly is Canadian sovereignty, what does it consist of, how is it justified and what has the country done to secure it? This dissertation is primarily an examination of those crucial questions. It covers the legal, political, military and economic factors which affected (or prevented) the formation of policy and the international framework in which these took place. It charts the evolution of that policy, from the late nineteenth century through to the final declaration of straight baselines in 1985, and studies the factors which guided and influenced Canadian decision makers. It is a history of Canada's quest to win international - and particularly American - recognition for its Arctic sovereignty while demonstrating how both countries still managed to work together in the region towards their mutual goals. (Au)
R, D, V
Boundaries; Economic policy; Foreign relations; Geopolitics; Government; History; Maritime law; Military operations; Sovereignty; Strategic studies; Theses
Canada; Canadian Arctic; United States
A new Mediterranean? Arctic shipping prospects for the 21st century / Lajeunesse, A.
(Journal of maritime law and commerce, v. 43, no. 4, Oct. 2012, p. 521-537)
References as footnotes.
ASTIS record 79216.
In 1921, Vilhjalmur Stefansson famously predicted that the Arctic would soon become a region of great strategic and commercial importance. Crisscrossed by the air and sea traffic of many nations, the region was to be the Mediterranean of the modern age. While Stefansson's prediction was certainly premature, recent economic and environmental developments suggest that a sea change may finally be taking place. The well documented melting of the region's sea-ice and the rush of tourist, oil and resource companies into the area have together created the potential for a radical increase in maritime activity, with all the consequences and opportunities that will go with it. Yet despite these changes, the more modern prophecies of an Arctic Mediterranean remain premature. Rather than a flood of international shipping seeking a shortcut through the Arctic, the next ten to twenty years will likely see an explosion of destinational traffic. This new traffic will be led by the tourism, oil, and mining industries which have all shown a new and sustained interest in the Canadian Arctic. And, given the investment which has already taken place, it is likely that this traffic will increase exponentially in the near future. This increased activity carries with it both risks and opportunities for Canada. If the country is to be prepared for, and benefit from, future traffic it will have to invest strategically in many of the areas which it has deferred for decades. These investments will have to range from improved hydrographic mapping, search and rescue resources, navigational aids and icebreaking and forecasting services to surveillance and law enforcement capabilities. Changes in policy and regulation will also have to be designed to ensure the maritime space is managed in an environmentally sustainable and politically acceptable manner. If managed correctly Arctic shipping can proceed safely and be a catalyst for economic growth. Just as importantly, from a policy perspective, this traffic need not be the assault on Canadian sovereignty which some commentators have feared. Rather, by developing the region's waterways and working with growing business interests, Canada will have a distinct opportunity to solidify its title by winning the acceptance of its jurisdiction which is demanded by international law in cases of proscribed sovereignty. ... (Au)
R, V, Q, L, G, D, J, E, P
Canadian Ice Service; Costs; Economic development; Emergency planning; Environmental protection; Forecasting; Foreign relations; Geological exploration; Government; History; Hydrographic surveys; Ice forecasting; Icebreaking; Insurance; International law; Manhattan (Ship); Marine oil spills; Marine petroleum transportation; Marine transportation; Maritime law; Melting; Mining; Navigational aids; Oil spill cleanup; Ore carriers; Petroleum transportation; Safety; Sea ice; Search and rescue; Sovereignty; Strategic studies; Weather forecasting
G081, G0815, G03
Arctic Ocean; Canada; Canadian Arctic Islands waters; Lancaster Sound, Nunavut; Northern Sea Route, Russian Federation; Northwest Passage
Negotiating sovereignty : the past and present failure of 'security' as a bargaining chip / Lajeunesse, A.
Toronto : Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, 2012.
14 p. : ill. ; 28 cm.
(Working papers on Arctic security, no. 5)
Indexed a PDF file from the Web.
ASTIS record 77658.
Negotiating Sovereignty looks at Canada's decades old legal disagreement with the United States over the status of the Arctic waters. In the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, with fears of terrorist infiltration into North America running high, the need to guard Canada's northern territories seemed to take on a new importance. The nation's Arctic harbours and airports were largely unsecured and academics, journalists and public officials issued warnings that foreigners seeking to slip into North America could do so through this porous border. Given this new focus on national and continental security, the opportunity existed for the two sides to sit down and work out a deal in which the U.S. recognized the waters of the Arctic Archipelago as "internal" in exchange for transit rights and a Canadian guarantee to secure the region from any possible threats. (Au)
V, R, T, L, D
Boundaries; Foreign relations; Geopolitics; Marine transportation; Maritime law; Military history; Military operations; Military policy; Negotiation; Sovereignty; Strategic studies; Submarines
G08, G0815, G03, G14
Arctic Ocean; Canada; Canadian Arctic Islands waters; Northwest Passage; Parry Channel, N.W.T./Nunavut; Russian Federation; United States
Climate change & international security : the Arctic as a bellwether / Huebert, R. Exner-Pirot, H. Lajeunesse, A. Gulledge, J.
Arlington, Va. : Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012.
iv, 50 p. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Report date: May 2012.
Indexed a PDF file from the Web.
ASTIS record 76411.
In its most recent assessment of global climate change, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences concluded, "A strong body of scientific evidence shows that climate change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses significant risks for a broad range of human and natural systems." Impacts and rates of change are greatest in the Arctic, where temperatures have been increasing at about twice the global rate over the past four decades. The rapid decline in summer sea ice cover in the past decade has outpaced scientific projections and is drawing international attention to emerging commercial development and transport opportunities previously blocked by the frozen sea. The Arctic is therefore a bellwether for how climate change may reshape geopolitics in the post-Cold War era. The trend toward seasonally open waters is driving increased interest and investment in oil and gas exploration, shipping, and fishing in the Arctic. The recent economic recession has not affected these developments significantly, as they were always intended to be middle- to long-term developments following the progression of sea ice retreat. Indeed, high oil prices and advances in technology continue to support the drive toward offshore drilling in Arctic waters. The global economy, which has begun to show signs of recovery, is likely to rebound long before oil and gas exploration and shipping could be scaled up in the Arctic. China, India and the rest of the developing world’s growing middle classes will need oil and gas and other resources, and the world’s shipping routes are already so congested that the development of northern shipping routes is not a question of if, but when. In response to these changes, many of the Arctic states have begun to re-examine their military capabilities to operate in the Arctic region. Some have started to rebuild their military forces, while most of the other states are drawing up plans to begin the rebuilding process. Multilateral organizations and non-Arctic states are also looking for new roles in the Arctic. All of these actors are attempting to come to terms with the meaning of Arctic security, a concept that was relatively simple during the icy decades of the Cold War. Recent national policy developments arising from the effects of climate change on the Arctic commons demonstrate that climate change is indeed a national and international security interest in the traditional strategic sense. As the emerging Arctic security environment is in a very early stage of development, whether it will ultimately be predominantly cooperative or predominantly competitive remains an open question. Although the Arctic states invariably emphasize their desire to maintain a cooperative environment, several have stated that they will defend their national interests in the region if necessary. To gauge the geopolitical winds in the Arctic, this study catalogs and analyzes dozens of major policy statements and actions by the Arctic states, other states with Arctic interests, and multilateral organizations between 2008 and 2012. As a framework for interpreting the totality of these statements and actions, we compare geopolitical developments to date with three future security scenarios posited by the Arctic Council in its Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report. We adopt these scenarios as testable hypotheses for the purposes of this study: Hypothesis 1: There is no emerging security environment and the circumpolar states have no new interests that would increase competition or conflict in the region. If this hypothesis is correct, a close examination of the actions of the circumpolar world should reveal no significant new foreign and defense policies and defense procurement decisions in relation to the Arctic. Hypothesis 2: While showing renewed interest in the Arctic, the interested states are committed to developing and strengthening multilateral instruments of cooperation. New military capabilities are direc ted towards building local constabulary capacity and largely eschew escalation of war-fighting capability. Hypothesis 3: Increasing accessibility to Arctic resources because of climate change, along with a growing and increasingly modern military presence of strategic rivals in the region, becomes a recipe for competition and potential conflict. Under this hypothesis, the circumpolar states should be actively examining their core interests in the region, expressing concern over what other states are planning or doing in the region, and developing more assertive northern defense postures, including rebuilding their northern war-fighting capabilities. It is also expected that the various actors would be commencing the process of developing new defensive relationships and either strengthening old alliances or building new ones. We assess which of these hypotheses most closely resembles the behavior of the key actors as revealed in their statements and actions. On the basis of the prevailing scenario(s), we consider the potential for instability and conflict in the Arctic and offer recommendations on how the states should proceed to ensure the region develops in a cooperative and peaceful manner. ... (Au)
R, L, V, J, E, P, Q, N
Arctic Council; Atmospheric temperature; Boundaries; Canadian Rangers; Climate change; Economic development; Environmental impacts; Environmental protection; Foreign relations; Geopolitics; Government; History; Ice cover; Icebreakers; International law; Marine transportation; Melting; Military operations; Military policy; NATO; Natural resources; Negotiation; NORAD; Planning; Satellites; Sea ice; Sovereignty; Temporal variations; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
G02, G08, G14, G10, G13, G06
Alaska; Arctic regions; Arctic waters; Asia; Canada; Denmark; Europe; Greenland; Hans Island, Greenland/Nunavut; Iceland; Russian Federation; Scandinavia; United States
Lock, stock, and icebergs? Defining Canadian sovereignty from Mackenzie King to Stephen Harper / Lajeunesse, A.
(Occasional paper - Calgary papers in military and strategic studies, no. 1, 2008, 15 p.)
ASTIS record 64068.
When announcing his government's plans to construct a fleet of Arctic patrol ships in July 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper declared that "Canada's Arctic is central to our national identity as a northern nation. It is part of our history. And it represents the tremendous potential of our future." This northern sentiment has been a common feature in the history of a nation which announces itself as the "True North Strong and Free." From the dawn of the Cold War, the point at which the issue of Arctic sovereignty first gained national prominence, to the present day, Canadian governments have consistently voiced their uncompromising dedication to the defence of Canada's northern heritage. The Arctic, as Brian Mulroney once put it, was Canadian, "lock, stock, and icebergs." But to what extent has this universally professed concern been reflected in the actions and policy of Canadian governments? Historically, Canadian policy has never matched its rhetoric in the Arctic. Regardless of how fervently politicians announced Canadian sovereignty, few have ever been willing to answer the hard questions associated with it or to stand up to the consequences of their declarations. Successive prime ministers may claim the Arctic to be inherently Canadian, but how do we define the Arctic, and by what right do we claim it to be Canadian? These are not trivial questions; indeed, the answers define the nature of Canadian sovereignty. Yet for decades they were avoided, along with any official claims. To have defined and asserted a real claim carried heavy costs, both financial and political. It meant dedicating the resources needed to assert that claim and dealing with the political repercussions which could result from it, a burden that Canadian governments have traditionally been loath to assume. In an age where competition in the Arctic is becoming more intense, with states vying for control of vast natural resources and potential shipping lanes, the issue of Arctic sovereignty can no longer be one of secondary concern. Canada can no longer dismiss the burdens which go hand-in-hand with sovereignty. It must decide how important the Arctic truly is to the nation and be ready to stand behind that decision. ... The greatest folly of Canadian Arctic policy has always been the tendency to avoid the political and financial costs inherent in having a clear policy. That, however, is exactly what Canada needs in the twenty-first century. The nation's territorial claims must be firm and precise and the government committed to their defence. No foreign state will respect ambiguous claims nor, in an age of increasing Arctic activity, will the opinions of a paper sovereign carry much weight. Canada must take a lesson from its own history. In the face of opposition, Arctic sovereignty is best defended with a clear and consistent policy, supported by the resources necessary to demonstrate and assert the nation's strong interest in the region. If Canada truly wishes to maintain its self-image as the "True North Strong and Free," it will have to start showing that it takes that title seriously. (Au)
R, V, Q, L
Boundaries; Climate change; Costs; DEW Line; Environmental impacts; Foreign relations; Geopolitics; Government; History; Icebreakers; Identity; Manhattan (Ship); Marine oil spills; Marine petroleum transportation; Military operations; Military policy; Polar Sea (Ship); Sovereignty; Submarines
Canadian Arctic; Canadian Arctic Islands waters; Northwest Passage; United States
The true North as long as it's free : the Canadian policy deficit 1945-1985 / Lajeunesse, A. Bercuson, D. [Supervisor] Huebert, R. [Supervisor]
Calgary, Alta. : University of Calgary, 2007.
vii, 95 p. : ill., map ; 28 cm.
(ProQuest Dissertations & Theses publication, no. MR34229)
Thesis (M.A.) - University of Calgary, Calgary, Alta., 2007.
Indexed from a PDF file acquired from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
ASTIS record 76596.
This thesis is an examination of Canadian policy in the Arctic from 1945 to 1985. Its focus is the issue of sovereignty and how successive governments have attempted to secure Canadian control and ownership over the Northern lands, ice and waters. Ironically, the greatest threat to Canadian sovereignty during the Cold War came from its closest ally, the United State of America. It is thus Canada's relations with the U.S. which are of principal concern. How Ottawa balanced its concerns for sovereignty with the need for continental defence, how it worked to secure American acceptance for its territorial claims, and how it attempted to avoid an American challenge to these claims are the issues which form the core of this thesis. (Au)
R, V, L, E
Boundaries; Costs; DEW Line; Foreign relations; Geopolitics; Government; History; Identity; International law; Manhattan (Ship); Military operations; Military policy; Polar Sea (Ship); Public opinion; Public relations; Sovereignty; Theses; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; Weather stations
G081, G0815, G08
Canada; Canadian Arctic; Canadian Arctic Islands waters; United States
© Arctic Institute of North America. Records from this database may be used freely for research and educational purposes, but may not be used to create databases or publications for distribution outside your own organization without prior permission from ASTIS.