Hydrocarbon Impacts = Incidences des hydrocarbures

Key Publications

A report to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development regarding issues arising from the Environmental Impact Review Board reviews of the Isserk and Kulluk drilling program applications   /   Beaufort Sea Steering Committee
[Vancouver, B.C.] : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, 1991.
10 v. : ill., maps ; 29 cm.
Cover title.
Appendices.
References.
Contents: Volume 1 : A report to the Minister ... - Volume 2, [part 1] : Report of Task Group One : worst case scenario - Volume 2, [part 2] : Report of Task Group One : worst case scenario : a report prepared on behalf of the Canadian Petroleum Association - Volume 3 : Report of Task Group Two : remedial and mitigative measures - Volume 4 : Report of Task Group Three : compensation and financial responsibility - Volume 5 : Report of Task Group Four : research and scientific study - Volume 6, [part 1] : Report of Task Group Five : government management - Volume 6, [part 2] : Appendices - Volume 7 : Report of Task Group Six : operating seasons - Volume 8 : Report of Task Group Seven : contingency plan testing and Inuvialuit involvement.
Each volume of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee report is described in more detail in its own ASTIS record.
BREA Report Type: Government Oil Spill Preparedness Assessment Report.
BREA Baseline Data: No.
BREA Biophysical / Valued Components: No.
BREA Development Scenarios / Activities: No.
BREA Impact Hypotheses: No.
BREA Environmental Concerns Identified: No.
BREA Harvest Concerns Identified: No.
BREA Social Concerns Identified: No.
BREA Research / Monitoring Recommendations: Yes, Monitoring and Research Response Plan for a major Beaufort Sea Oil Spill.
ASTIS record 38385.
Languages: English
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33778.pdf
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/48599.pdf
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33779.pdf
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/48600.pdf
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33781.pdf
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/48601.pdf
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33783a.pdf
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33783b.pdf
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33796.pdf
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33784.pdf
Libraries: ACU

... The Steering Committee reviewed the work of seven Task Groups set up to examine government contingency plans for an oil blowout, same season relief well contingency plans, contingency plan testing and review, Inuvialuit involvement in contingency planning and cleanup operations, the costing of countermeasures and the development of a worst case scenario, compensation and financial liability, the nature and cost of remedial and mitigative measures possible in the Beaufort Sea, scientific processes relating to research to be undertaken in the event of a spill, assessment methodology and databases. With respect to government contingency plans, the Steering Committee has concluded that the principle that, the agency responsible for authorizing a development should have full responsibility for spill prevention and cleanup, is acceptable and indeed desirable. ... and the operator has the initial responsibility to take all necessary steps to control the incident. ... With respect to same season relief well contingency planning, the Steering Committee supports the objective of same season relief well drilling capability and believes that the objective should be maintained. ... With respect to industry contingency plan review and testing, the Steering Committee has concluded that the process of reviewing industry contingency plans is adequate, but the process requires a clear audit trail ... The Steering Committee concludes that there is a requirement for a more rigorous, better defined testing procedure for these plans. ... With respect to Inuvialuit involvement in contingency planning and cleanup, the Steering Committee concludes that there are now several ways of involving Inuvialuit in contingency planning which should be employed. ... The Steering Committee recommends that Inuvialuit be involved in the consideration of Beaufort Sea transboundary issues concerning wildlife and wildlife habitat. With respect to the costing of countermeasures and the development of a worst case scenario, the Steering Committee concludes that a worst case scenario is best developed by the operator to fit the location and time of drilling. However, the Steering Committee is satisfied that a methodology acceptable to the Inuvialuit, the petroleum industry and government has been developed to determine the cost of any worst case scenario. With respect to financial responsibility, the Steering Committee concludes that it is essential that the dispute between Government and the Inuvialuit on the proper interpretation of Section 13 of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) be resolved ... The Steering Committee recommends that the government seek a letter of credit from an operator to cover harvest loss and insurance from an operator to cover the costs of remedial and mitigative measures. ... With respect to remedial and mitigative measures, the Steering Committee concludes that the emphasis of the industry and the regulator when preparing contingency plans must be on prevention, adequate countermeasures and habitat protection because: the state of knowledge concerning restoration options is limited ... With respect to research in the event of oil blowout, the Steering Committee recommends that industry take the lead in planning for such research now ... With respect to assessment methodology, the Steering Committee concludes that the environmental impact assessment methodology being developed ... should be examined by EIRB staff and industry. With respect to scientific databases, the Steering Committee concludes that the present information database is extensive and comprehensive and the adequacy of the database should be examined by the Beaufort Region Environmental Assessment and Monitoring Program. ... In summary, a thorough review of government preparedness for an oil blowout in the Beaufort Sea has produced among the members of the Steering Committee a sense that there exists within government and industry the will to work hard to prevent an oil blowout an the ability to respond quickly to a blowout if it were to occur. (Au)

Volume 1 : a report to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development regarding issues arising from the Environmental Impact Review Board reviews of the Isserk and Kulluk drilling program applications   /   Beaufort Sea Steering Committee
[Vancouver, B.C.] : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, 1991.
xxiv, 44, 1, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 11 p. : ill., 1 map ; 29 cm.
Cover title.
Appendix A : Recommendations of the Workshop on Wildlife Compensation and the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, March 21 and 22, 1990 - Appendix B : Recommendations of the Environmental Impact Review Board resulting from their review of the Gulf Canada Resources Limited Kulluk drilling program, June 1990 - Appendix C - Beaufort Sea Steering Committee terms of reference - Appendix D : Membership of Task Groups Beaufort Sea Steering Committee - Appendix E : Definitions - Appendix F : Acronyms - Appendix G : Federal acts pertaining to Beaufort Sea Development - Appendix H : Sections 11 and 13 of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement.
Each volume of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee report is described by its own ASTIS record. The report as a whole is described by ASTIS record 38385.
ASTIS record 33778.
Languages: English
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33778.pdf
Libraries: ACU

... The Steering Committee was made up of representatives from the Inuvialuit, the petroleum industry, the territorial governments and the federal government, all the parties who have a direct interest in the management of exploration activity in the Beaufort Sea. The Steering Committee reviewed the work of seven Task Groups set up to examine government contingency plans for an oil blowout, same season relief well contingency plans, contingency plan testing and review, Inuvialuit involvement in contingency planning and cleanup operations, the costing of countermeasures and the development of a worst case scenario, compensation and financial liability, the nature and cost of remedial and mitigative measures possible in the Beaufort Sea, scientific processes relating to research to be undertaken in the event of a spill, assessment methodology and databases. With respect to government contingency plans, the Steering Committee has concluded that the principle that the agency responsible for authorizing a development should have full responsibility for spill prevention and cleanup is acceptable and indeed desirable. It also recognizes that the liability and responsibility of the operator in the case of an oil well blowout is clearly defined in the Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act and the operator has the initial responsibility to take all necessary steps to control the incident. The Steering Committee concludes that the Arctic Seas Strategy is an acceptable framework for contingency plans relating to an oil blowout but it believes that the strategy must a) be clarified with respect to the role of the resource agencies in relation to the lead agency, b) strengthen its links with the Beaufort Sea communities and c) become better known by all parties, including the public. With respect to same season relief well contingency planning, the Steering Committee supports the objective of same season relief well drilling capability and believes that the objective should be maintained. The Steering Committee proposes that a standardized technique for determining the end of season date for risk drilling be used. [Other recommendations include:] ... that Inuvialuit be involved in the consideration of Beaufort Sea transboundary issues concerning wildlife and wildlife habitat. ... that the government seek a letter of credit from an operator to cover harvest loss and insurance from an operator to cover the costs of remedial and mitigative measures. ... that all parties begin the task of determining which restoration methods used by industry and government are acceptable. ... that industry take the lead in planning for such research now that the responsibility for the research be delegated to a member of the spill response team. ... that the adequacy of the database should be examined by the Beaufort Region Environmental Assessment and Monitoring Program. ... (Au)

Volume 2, [part 1] : report of Task Group One : worst case scenario   /   S.L. Ross Environmental Research Ltd.   Canada. Environmental Protection Branch   Canada Oil and Gas Lands Administration   Beaufort Sea Steering Committee [Sponsor]
[Vancouver, B.C.] : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, 1991.
2, ix, 129 p. : ill., maps ; 28 cm.
Cover title.
Alternate title: Report by Task Group Number One : worst case scenario.
Alternate title: Assessing the costs of a major oil spill in the Canadian Beaufort Sea for Task Group 1 of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee.
References.
Each volume of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee report is described by its own ASTIS record. The report as a whole is described by ASTIS record 38385. Neither of the two parts of Volume 2 contain any indication that there is another part.
ASTIS record 48599.
Languages: English
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/48599.pdf
Libraries: ACU

This report describes methods for calculating: [1] the likely effectivenss of offshore oil spill cleanup operations in response to oil well blowouts in the Southern Beaufort Sea; [2] the number of ships, aircraft, equipment, personnel, etc. required to conduct: offshore oil spill cleanup operations; shoreline protection operations; shoreline cleanup operations; surveillnce and monitoring; disposal operations; spring in-situ burning; and, landfast ice cleanup. [3] an estimated cost for each of the above operations broken down into direct operating costs, indirect support and administration costs and capital costs; [4] an estimated cost for relief well drilling operations. The methods are applied to four example blowout scenarios in order to illustrate the use of the techniques. The four scenarios used are: 1. a 10,000 BOPD subsea blowout in 30 m of water in summer, open-water conditions at 70 6' N, 134 W. 2. a 10,000 BOPD subsea blowout in 30 m of water in fall, lasting through freeze-up, under transition zone ice at 70 6' N, 134 W. 3. a 5000 BOPD above-sea or platform blowout from an artificial island near the Mackenzie Delta in summer open-water conditions at 69 39' N, 136 W. 4. a 5000 BOPD above-sea blowout from an artificial island near the Mackenzie Delta in winter landfast ice conditions at 69 39' N, 136 W. ... (Au)

Volume 2, [part 2] : report of Task Group One : worst case scenario : a report prepared on behalf of the Canadian Petroleum Association   /   Adams Pearson Associates Inc.   Canadian Petroleum Association [Sponsor]   Beaufort Sea Steering Committee [Sponsor]
[Vancouver, B.C.] : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, 1991.
ix, 16, 5, 47, 3, 7, 6, 10, [45] p. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Cover title.
Alternate title: Report by Task Group Number One : worst case scenario : a report prepared on behalf of the Canadian Petroleum Association.
Alternate title: Recommended philosophy for development of a worst case blowout scenario for wells drilled in the Beaufort Sea.
References.
Each volume of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee report is described by its own ASTIS record. The report as a whole is described by ASTIS record 38385. Neither of the two parts of Volume 2 contain any indication that there is another part.
ASTIS record 33779.
Languages: English
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33779.pdf
Libraries: ACU

This study forms part of the Beaufort Sea Committee Task Group Number 1's effort "to create a generally acceptable procedure for developing and estimating the potential cost of a "worst case" scenario". Previous studies had shown that the probability of an uncontrolled oil well blowout involving more than 20,000 m (125,800 bbls) of oil in the Beaufort Sea is significantly less than the 1 in 10,000 wells implied from historical data. While potential blowout rates in the Beaufort had been estimated at between 1000 m/d and 6500 m/d, duration was expected to be limited by hole collapse, or by control from surface. Updating these studies with more recently published data indicates that the trend of a decreasing frequency of exploration well blowouts is continuing; and confirms that oil well blowouts are much less common than gas well blowouts. ... Since most Beaufort wells involve normal pressured sandstone reservoirs with shallow dips and relatively short hydrocarbon columns, they should be classified as having a low blowout risk. Even the deeper wells, which penetrate the overpressures, would only be ranked as a moderate risk, especially since permeability deteriorates rapidly with depth. High risk features (such as fractured carbonates; extreme pressures and temperatures; and sour gas) are rarely encountered in the Beaufort, significantly reducing the probability and complexity of any blowout. Most blowouts are quickly controlled from surface, many in less than 1 day. A substantial number of wells kill themselves by bridging-off or by increasing water production. Less than 5% of oil blowouts require the drilling of a relief well. Therefore, it seemed logical to examine two blowout scenarios: i) A high rate, short duration event controlled from surface or by formation collapse. ii) A low rate, long duration event requiring a relief well. (Au)

Volume 3 : report of Task Group Two : remedial and mitigative measures   /   North/South Consultants   Lawrence, M. [Editor]   Beaufort Sea Steering Committee [Sponsor]
[Vancouver, B.C.] : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, 1991.
2, xiii, 184 p. : ill., maps ; 29 cm.
Cover title.
Alternate title: Report by Task Group Number Two : remedial and mitigative measures.
Alternate title: Wildlife and wildlife habitat restoration and compensation in the event of an oil spill in the Beaufort Sea : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, Task Group 2 : remediation and mitigation : final report, March 1991.
Appendices.
References.
Contents: Part 1 : Background, scope and approach / R. Hurst - Part 2 : Wildlife and wildlife habitat restoration in the event of an oil spill in the Beaufort Sea / M. Lawrence (North/South Consultants Inc.), R. Hurst (Dept. of Indian and Northern Affairs), W.E. Cross (LGL Limited), and J. Harper (Harper Environmental Services) - Part 3 : Wildlife compensation in the event of an oil spill in the Beaufort Sea : Synopsis of the Compensation Workshop, Calgary, Dec. 11 and 12, 1990 / S.L. Davies (North/South Consultants Inc.) and C.F. Osler (InterGroup Consultants Ltd.) - Part 4 : Wildlife and wildlife habitat restoration in the event of an oil spill in the Beaufort Sea : a discussion paper / William E. Cross, Tracy L. Hillis, Rolph A. Davis (LGL Limited) for North/South Consultants, Inc. - Part 5 : Wildlife compensation in the event of an oil spill in the Beaufort Sea : a discussion paper / S.L. Davies (North/South Consultants Inc.) and C.F. Osler (InterGroup Consultants Ltd.).
Each volume of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee report is described by its own ASTIS record. The report as a whole is described by ASTIS record 38385.
ASTIS record 48600.
Languages: English
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/48600.pdf
Libraries: ACU

... The report examines the issue of mitigative and remedial measures as specified in the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA). It also addresses the need to create a generally acceptable procedure for developing and estimating the cost of a "worst case" oil blowout scenario, as it relates to restoration and compensation. The work is in response to Isserk recommendations #6 and #3 of the March 1990 Workshop on Wildlife Compensation and the Inuvialuit Final Agreement. A procedure was developed and tested by: applying assessments of vulnerability and sensitivity of valued wildlife species; evaluating the practicality of restoration options (e.g. wildlife deterrents, cleaning and treatment, habitat enhancement and bioremediation); and estimating the costs of these restoration measures. Compensation costs for Definitions are proposed for mitigation, remediation and for other terms in the context of their usage in the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, and a discussion is presented on the issue of "How clean is clean?" ... The final report is presented in five parts: Part I: Background, Scope and Approach; Part II: Wildlife and Wildlife Habitat Restoration in the Event of an Oil Spill in the Beaufort Sea; Part III: Wildlife Compensation in the Event of an Oil Spill in the Beaufort Sea; Part IV: Workshop Discussion Paper; a Review of Wildlife Restoration Options and their Applicability to the Beaufort Sea Area; and Part V: Workshop Discussion Paper; Compensation Models and Methodologies Employed in the Beaufort Sea Region and Elsewhere. ... (Au)

Volume 4 : report of Task Group Three : compensation and financial responsibility   /   Beaufort Sea Steering Committee
[Vancouver, B.C.] : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, 1991.
14, [6] p. ; 28 cm.
Cover title.
Alternate title: Report by Task Group Number Three : compensation and financial responsibility.
Alternate title: Task Group #3 report on wildlife compensation and instruments of financial responsibility.
Appendix A : Section 13 of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement.
Each volume of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee report is described by its own ASTIS record. The report as a whole is described by ASTIS record 38385.
ASTIS record 33781.
Languages: English
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33781.pdf
Libraries: ACU

This document is submitted to the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee ("BSSC") as the final report of Task Group 3. It sets out the concerns of the Environmental Impact Review Board ("EIRB") expressed in the Isserk and Kulluk hearings with respect to the compensation and remedial and mitigative obligations of a developer. It examines the legislative overlap of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement ("IFA"), Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act ("AWPPA"), and Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act ("OGPCA"), and studies how such overlap affects the liability and financial instruments provisions of the IFA. It then reports on progress made by Task Group 3 to develop guidelines which might be used to assess "instruments of financial responsibility" required pursuant to section of the IFA. Task Group 3 is also developing a draft wildlife compensation agreement which is the subject of Part E of this paper. The complexity of the issues examined by Task Group 3 have prevented us from making definitive recommendations at this time. However, continuing efforts are being taken to reach a satisfactory conclusion. (Au)

Volume 5 : report of Task Group Four : research and scientific study   /   Beaufort Sea Steering Committee
[Vancouver, B.C.] : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, 1991.
2, xiii, 55 p. ; 28 cm.
Cover title.
Alternate title: Report by Task Group Number Four : research and scientific study.
Alternate title: Scientific response planning, information database requirements and environmental assessment methodology for an oil spill in the Beaufort Sea : final report by Task Group Number Four : research and science.
Appendices.
References.
Contents: BSSC Task Group 4 final report : part I : Scientific response to a Beaufort Sea oil spill, Isserk recommendation #5 - BSSC Task Group 4 final report : part II : Assessment methodology, Kulluk recommendation #7 - BSSC Task Group 4 final report : part III : Information database Kulluk recommendation #6.
Each volume of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee report is described by its own ASTIS record. The report as a whole is described by ASTIS record 38385.
ASTIS record 48601.
Languages: English
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/48601.pdf
Libraries: ACU

... Task Group Four was charged with addressing three recomendations related to reserch and science. This Final Report is presented in three parts corresponding to those recommendations: I. Isserk Recommendation #5 Scientific (Research) Response Plan; II. Kulluk Recommendation #7 Environmental Assessment Methodology; and III. Kulluk Recommendation #6 Information Database Requirements. ... Part 1: Scientific Response to a Beaufort Sea Oil Spill: Isserk Recommendation 5: Encourage the creation or the reactivation of a scientific response team capable of conducting useful research in direct and immediate response to a Beaufort Sea oil spill. ... Part II: Environmental Assessment Methodology: Kulluk Recommendation 7: The Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Department of Environment must undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, a study to define the assessment methodology that should be used in determining the impacts that might be associated with a major oil spill incident in the Beaufort Sea. The Canadian Petroleum Association, the Inuvialuit and the Governments of the Northwest territories and Yukon, should be involved in developing the terms of reference for this study and in its implementation to the extent appropriate. ... Part III: Information Database : Kulluk 6: an independent task force must be established to examine the research, management and funding requirements necessary to ensure that the information database is in place to facilitate environmental impact assessment and countermeasures and contingency planning, relating to an offshore oil spill in the Beaufort Sea. (Au)

Volume 6 : report of Task Group Five : government management   /   Beaufort Sea Steering Committee
[Vancouver, B.C.] : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, 1991.
2 v. : ill., maps ; 28 cm.
Cover title.
Alternate title, [part 1] : Report by Task Group Number Five : government management.
Alternate title, [part 1] : Report on Beaufort Sea oil spill management.
Alternate title, [part 2] : Report by Task Group Number Five : government management : appendices.
Alternate title, [part 2] : List of appendices in support of report by Task Group 5 on Beaufort Sea oil spill management.
Appendices.
References.
Contents: Volume 6, [part 1] : Report of Task Group Five : government management - Volume 6, [part 2] : Report of Task Group Five : government management : appendices / Michael Jarvis Consultants Limited and J. Anthony Stikeman.
Each volume of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee report is described by its own ASTIS record. The report as a whole is described by ASTIS record 38385.
ASTIS record 33783.
Languages: English
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33783a.pdf
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33783b.pdf
Libraries: ACU

... The federal government's oil spill prevention and management plans rest on a variety of Acts and supporting regulations which govern drilling for oil and gas, marine transportation and land use activities. These statutes and associated regulations reflect certain fundamental government policies, namely: the oil and gas operator will implement and pay for all appropriate measures to prevent, prepare for and respond to an oil spill; government will take the lead only if the operator is unable to respond; depending on the source of the spill, a specific government agency will assume the role of lead agency to ensure that appropriate clean-up measures are taken and the environment is adequately protected; the lead agency will be supported by one or more resource agencies with unique expertise to provide specific assistance; and the lead agency will designate an on-scene Commander. ... In order to determine the optimum government system to manage its Beaufort Sea oil spill responsibilities, Task Group Five examined three organizational options, namely: (i) a special oil spill agency; (ii) a single government department responsible for all oil spills, regardless of source; (iii) a single government department responsible for spills according to their source. ... The Task Group concluded that the option which would facilitate the most efficient and effective government management is the one where the lead agency is designated according to the source of the spill. It would be sufficiently flexible to allow different departments to take complete charge of those spills for which they have the most technical expertise, resource capability and legislative responsibility. For drilling and well blow-out control, this would be COGLA (DIAND). This is consistent with the assignment of responsibility for oil spill counter-measures and clean up on the East Coast of Canada, as well as in the United States and the United Kingdom. This management approach would give a specific department such as COGLA (DIAND) full and continuous responsibility and accountability for all aspects of prevention, countermeasures and clean-up related to spills under its jurisdiction. The Task Group made certain recommendations to improve the Government's management of its Beaufort Sea oil spill responsibilities. Certain recommendations are intended to strengthen the government's existing policy framework, the Arctic Seas Strategy. These include examining the Strategy in depth, evaluating the government's contingency plans and level of preparedness, ensuring that industry and government fully understand each other's roles and responsibilities, and tabling annual reports. ... (Au)

Volume 7 : report of Task group Six : operating seasons   /   Amoco Canada Petroleum Co.   BeauDril Limited   Canadian Marine Drilling Ltd.   Chevron Canada Resources Limited   Esso Resources Canada   Gulf Canada Resources Inc.   Shell Canada Limited   AOE Consultants Ltd. [Editor]   Beaufort Sea Steering Committee [Sponsor]
[Vancouver, B.C.] : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, 1991.
2, 4, v, viii, 9, 8, 72, 21, 9, 14, 7, [37] p. : ill. ; 29 cm.
Cover title.
Alternate title: Report by Task Group Number Six : operating seasons.
Bound with: Volume 7 : Report of Task Group Six : operating seasons : a report prepared on behalf of the Canadian Petroleum Association : appendices.
Appendices.
References.
Each volume of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee report is described by its own ASTIS record. The report as a whole is described by ASTIS record 38385.
ASTIS record 33796.
Languages: English
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33796.pdf
Libraries: ACU

... This report describes the operational characteristics of each of the different drilling systems used in the Beaufort Sea with particular emphasis on their late-season capabilities. It is a technical document and has not been accepted in its entirety by all technical reviewers. This is not an unusual circumstance considering that exploration in the Beaufort spans only two decades and is still a pioneering exercise. It is a credit to the operators and to the regulatory government agencies that 89 wells have been drilled to date in the Beaufort Sea without a major human or environmental mishap. The main area of contention concerns the ability of drillships to operate in heavy ice conditions late in the season. Simply put, the view of the operators presented in this report is that effective drilling operations could continue, from a drillship, until new ice reaches a thickness of 60 cm. This scenario would be with the support of five or more ice-breakers and with an unlimited budget, circumstances associated with a relief well. The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) has expressed reservations that a drillship would be effective in this thickness of new ice. It is recognized that the regulator, must adopt a conservative policy when granting approvals. At the time of writing the Canada Oil and Gas Lands Administration (COGLA) is the federal regulatory agency. COGLA is being disbanded but its successor will be bound by the same legislation, guidelines and policies. In granting approvals for activities, COGLA is guided by the advice of the Canadian Coast Guard and other governmental agencies having relevant expertise such as the Department of the Environment, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the territorial governments to name but a few. It is important to recognize that drilling technology in the Beaufort Sea has advanced considerably since the original relief well policy was formulated in 1976. ... With the icebreakers available in 1979 a drillship continued to operate in a drilling mode until November 29th. In all subsequent approvals for floating units, the limiting date for risk drilling operations was set at September 25th to allow about 65 days for a relief well. A few extensions beyond this date have been allowed on an individual basis where circumstances warranted. ... The essential elements of the original relief well policy remain unchanged after careful examination in the light of this report. In the case of the floating drilling units, drilling above risk threshold depth after September 25th is allowed. Testing in fully-cased hole with "fail-safe" production devices is also allowed beyond September 25th in some individual cases. The need to select a cut-off date of September 25th (or earlier in September in the case of a very deep well) for risk drilling from a floater is seen as essential. ... If safe to do so, limited additional operations may be allowed beyond the review date under stipulated conditions that would reduce risk to an acceptable level. Similarly, where caissons and artificial islands are utilized as the primary drilling platform, provisions for relief well capability is an important prerequisite for approval of drilling programs. The operator must also demonstrate the capability for an immediate response to contain a blowout and to start a relief well. In every case, a limiting date for risk drilling is specified as a condition of approval. This date is established separately for each type of drilling system and must provide sufficient time for a relief well to be completed within the drilling season for the particular system. It remains the responsibility of the operator and of the regulator to be certain that relief well contingency is available wherever and whenever exploratory drilling operations take place in the Arctic frontier. (Au)

Volume 8 : report of Task Group Seven : contingency plan testing and Inuvialuit involvement   /   Beaufort Sea Steering Committee
[Vancouver, B.C.] : Beaufort Sea Steering Committee, 1991.
13, [38] p. : ill. ; 28 cm.
Cover title.
Alternate title: Report by Task Group Number Seven : contingency plan testing and Inuvialuit involvement.
Bound with: Observations on the Environmental Impact Review Board's June 29, 1990, decision report on Gulf Canada Resources Limited's proposed Kulluk Drilling Program.
Each volume of the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee report is described by its own ASTIS record. The report as a whole is described by ASTIS record 38385.
ASTIS record 33784.
Languages: English
Web: http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/misc/33784.pdf
Libraries: ACU

At the conclusion of the Environmental Impact Review Board hearings into the Gulf Canada Resources Kulluk DPA application, the Board recommended, among other things, that a surprise exercise to test the effectiveness of contingency plans be held annually in the Beaufort Sea. The Board further recommended that such exercises be held in realistic operating conditions. A Task Group was struck by the Beaufort Sea Steering Committee to assess this recommendation. The Task Group began with a workshop in Inuvik in November of 1990 attended by experts in oilspill contingency plans. This was followed by a number of in-depth interviews in the weeks following. As a result of these consultations, a distinction was drawn between the capacity of a contingency plan and its capability. The former was defined to refer to the presence of the required equipment while the latter refers to the ability of the equipment to do its prescribed job. Any contingency plan testing should be able to answer two central questions about the components of the plan: are they there and do they work as promised in the plan? The Task Group concluded that surprise tests were not always appropriate and that while some elements of a contingency plan could be surprise tested, others were more appropriately demonstrated through planned exercises. The Task Group went on to describe a number of testing mechanisms which could be used to review a contingency plan short of actual plan operation. These included tests for compliance, coordination, and reality and obligatory tests. These various tests could be applied to the appropriate elements of a plan to ensure that they, like the equipment, actually worked. In conclusion, the Task Group recommends that a joint industry-government group be struck to develop a contingency plan testing methodology for use in the Beaufort. (Au)

Return to the Hydrocarbon Impacts (HI) Database